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AGENDA-SETTING IN THE REGULATORY
STATE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
CARY COGLIANESE* & DANIEL E. WALTERS**

During the Obama Administration, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) took notable steps to address climate change by issuing a
variety of significant new rules under the Clean Air Act. What led this
agency to the front lines of such major and controversial policy actions?
The EPA moved forward not only because of the priorities of its leaders but
also because of a variety of outside pressures, including interest group
lobbying, the filing of a formal petition for rulemaking,' a major Supreme
Court decision clarifying the agency's authority under the Clean Air Act,2
various legislative proposals and numerous committee hearings on Capitol
Hill,3 and ultimately a major climate initiative announced by President
Obama. 4 All of these factors shaped the EPA's policy agenda and in
* Edward B. Shils Professor of Law, Professor of Political Science, and Director of
the Penn Program on Regulation, University of Pennsylvania Law School. We gratefully
acknowledge support from the University of Pennsylvania Law School and from Allen J.
Model and the Leo Model Foundation. We also greatly appreciate helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this Essay from John Kingdon, Connor Raso, Jeffrey Rosen, and Glen
Stazsewski, as well as input from all the participants at the workshop organized by the Penn
Program on Regulation in November 2014, whose names are listed in the Appendix. This
Essay represents the authors' efforts to summarize and synthesize the perspectives expressed
at that workshop. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the authors, the
Penn Program on Regulation, or any of those providing support for this project.
Furthermore, although this Essay synthesizes the workshop dialogue, it does not necessarily
represent the views of all the participants nor should it be construed to represent a consensus
statement or a shared set of recommendations.
*Regulation Fellow, 2013-2015, Penn Program on Regulation, University of
Pennsylvania Law School.
1. See Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J. Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking New
Ground on Issues Other than Global Warming, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1029, 1029-30, 1040, 104243, 1045 (2008).
2. Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 549 U.S. 497, 533
(2007).
3. JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43230, CLIMATE CHANGE
LEGISLATION IN THE 113TH CONGRESS 1 (2014).
4. See generally EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT'S CLIMATE ACTION
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varying ways contributed to the agency's decision to target the issue of
climate change through rulemaking. Action that was largely unthinkable
not that long before-namely, the idea of regulating climate change
without the passage of new legislation-eventually became a reality. But it
was never destined so, nor was it an easy or straightforward path that led
the Obama Administration's EPA to take a bold position of leadership in
climate-related regulation.
Reflecting on the winding path that led the EPA to regulate climate
change under forty-year-old legislation calls attention to a vital but seldom
studied part of the rulemaking process: the agenda-setting stage. Other
stages of the regulatory process-rule promulgation and enforcement, for
example-have been quite visible and more widely studied by regulatory
scholars. 5 But the stage preceding both of these is one where some of the
most critical decisions are made to define what issues will eventually make it
to the important later stages of promulgation and implementation. In
short, early agenda-setting decisions affect and structure all that comes
afterwards. With finite resources and a greater number of problems to deal
with than those resources could possibly support, all agencies' choices at the
agenda-setting stage can have a major impact on the agencies' ultimate
regulatory performance. Agencies, like anyone, face opportunity costs; a
decision to address one problem through rulemaking necessarily crowds out
attention to other problems.
For these reasons, regulatory agenda-setting merits careful analysis and
systemic study. And yet both real and perceived difficulties in carrying out
empirical research have generally kept researchers interested in regulation
and administrative law from explicitly studying agenda-setting dynamics.
This research deficit has undoubtedly led to missed opportunities to
understand how to make the entire regulatory process more coherent,
systemic, responsive, and efficient. Despite consistent calls for reform of the
regulatory process along a variety of dimensions-whether by improving
the rigor of regulatory analysis or expanding the participation of the
public-it is possible, if not likely, that none of these ideas will fully cure
whatever ails the regulatory process if the agenda-setting stage remains
ignored. All truly comprehensive efforts to improve the regulatory system
in the United States will need to be grounded on empirical research that
illuminates the workings of-as well as dysfunctions of-the entire
PLAN (2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimate
actionplan.pdf.
5. See, e.g., EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK ix-x (2002)
(discussing enforcement and implementation); CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R.
FURLONG, RULEMAKING xi-xii, 2 (4th ed. 2011) (discussing rulemaking).
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regulatory process, from start to finish.
This Essay makes a step forward in advancing the study of the agendasetting process in the regulatory state. It synthesizes an in-depth set of
discussions that occurred at a workshop organized under the auspices of the
Penn Program on Regulation in Washington, D.C. in late 2014. We
brought together more than two dozen leading scholars, practitioners, and
government officials to discuss agenda-setting in the regulatory process.6
Included in the workshop were the handful of social scientists who have
attempted some of the few empirical studies on regulatory agenda-setting,
as well as the comparably small number of legal scholars who have
considered various legal and normative issues surrounding agenda-setting.
Many other workshop participants brought government experience to the
table as well, with an intentionally broad range of government perches:
some had served at older agencies (e.g., the Department of Transportation),
while others had worked at newer agencies (e.g., the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau); some came from agencies engaged in social regulation
(e.g., the Environmental Protection Agency), while others worked at
financial regulatory agencies (e.g., the Securities and Exchange
Commission); and some worked on Capitol Hill and others in the White
House. A few had government experience across all three branches of
government. This highly diverse group of participants gathered for a full
day to discuss, for the first time as far as we are aware, the hidden world of
regulatory agenda-setting. This Essay details what their discussion revealed
about what scholars and practitioners know or, at least, what they think
they know about the much too-hidden realm of regulatory agendasetting. By synthesizing our workshop dialogue in this Essay, we provide
insights about the direction future research should take, as well as establish
a foundation upon which more research may be built, thereby increasing
the knowledge upon which future efforts to reform the regulatory agendasetting process may be based.
I. THE CONCEPT OF AGENDA-SETTING

The concept of agenda-setting can be construed narrowly or broadly. In
the narrowest sense, an agency's regulatory agenda can be taken to mean,
quite literally, the listings it provides in its semi-annual Unified Agenda of
Regulatoy and De-Regulatoy Actions (Unified Agenda) or its annual Regulatoy

6. A list of participants appears in the Appendix to this Essay. The dialogue was
conducted on a not-for-attribution basis in accordance with the Chatham House rule. As a
result, ideas expressed in this synthesis essay should be ascribed neither to any particular
individual nor to any organization with which any participant is affiliated.
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Plan-documents the agency is required to produce under the Regulatory
Flexibility Act and Executive Order 12,866.7 This narrow understanding
of an agency agenda has certain advantages, particularly in terms of
establishing a baseline agreement on key concepts, definitions, and metrics
that are generally relevant to evaluating agenda-setting. For instance, the
Unfied Agenda has built-in classifications for the significance of a rulemaking
action, 8 and the Regulatoy Plan by definition is supposed to identify only the
agency's highest priorities.9
But there are also disadvantages of such a narrow focus, as the Unified
Agenda misses much of the work of a regulatory agency. After all, agencies
also undertake enforcement actions, other adjudicatory actions made in
field offices around the country, and even decisions not to act-none of
which will be included within the scope of the Unified Agenda or the Regulatoy
Plan but which still can have important implications for the public.
Moreover, even with respect to rulemaking, what gets logged in official lists
and plans does not include everything; an agency's agenda "on the books"
does not necessarily mirror its agenda "in action." While it can be
tempting to reach for a conceptualization of agenda-setting that allows one
to say definitively that an item is "on" or "off' the agenda, agenda-setting
in reality is more like a continuum, with items rising or falling on the
agenda as circumstances change.' 0 Thus, despite all that can be gained
7.

Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. § 602 (2012); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed.

Reg. 51,735, 51,739 (Oct. 4, 1993); see also CURTIS W. COPELAND, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES (ACUS), THE UNIFIED AGENDA: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (2015),

https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Unified%20Agenda%20Report%200
31015.pdf. For direct online access to the latest Unified Agenda of Regulatog and De-Regulatog
Actions (Unified Agenda or Regulatog Plan) (as well as historical entries), see Current Regulatog Plan
and the Unified Agenda of Regulatop and Deregulatop Actions, OFF. OF INFO. AND REGULATORY
AFFAIRS (OIRA), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaMain (last visited Feb. 1,
2016).
8. See, e.g., How to Read the Unified Agenda, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV'T,
http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/4062 (last visited Jan. 7, 2016) (discussing the
information available in Unified Agenda entries, including the "priority level," which varies
from "Economically Significant"-those having an annual effect of at least $100 million-to
"Substantive/Nonsignificant" and "Routine and Frequent").
9. Id.
The [Regulatory] Plan is more focused than the Unified Agenda. Whereas the
Unified Agenda is to include 'all regulations under development or review,' the Plan
includes only 'significant' regulations. Significant regulations are pared even further
so that only the most important are included in the Plan. Additional requirements
associated with each rule in the Plan include a statement of need and may include a
summary of legal basis, alternatives to the proposed regulation, anticipated costs and
benefits, and risks.
Id.
10. JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1984). John
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with simple, consistent conventions for tracking an agency's agenda via the
Unified Agenda or Regulatory Plan, much can also be missed, especially if the
goal is to understand when and why agendas change.
For these reasons, instead of limiting the workshop discussion exclusively
to agencies' formal Unfied Agenda, we invited participants to offer their own
conceptions of what constitutes a regulatory agenda. Especially given the
paucity of research on regulatory agenda-setting, fuller consideration of the
concept of an "agenda" in the regulatory setting can itself help advance
future research.
Our workshop's starting point, then, was to treat
agenda-setting in a relatively open-ended, broad fashion so as to include all
the choices and opportunities that both agency officials and other
participants in the regulatory process have about what problems agencies
emphasize and what alternatives they consider.
Outside of the context of administrative agencies, of course, political
scientists have studied the nature of public policy agenda-setting for years."
They have been motivated to explain why, at any given time in
Washington, D.C., some issues occupy the attention of political elites but
not others. For example, why did welfare reform rise to the foreground of
attention in the 1990s but not Social Security reform? Why did health care
policy occupy so much attention in the first decade of the 2000s but not
transportation policy?
Political scientist John Kingdon has famously
developed a theory of agenda-setting based on policy "streams"-streams
of "problem recognition," "formation and refining of policy proposals,"
and "politics"-each of which must join together for an issue to find its way
onto the general policy agenda.' 2 When these three streams unite because
of a focusing event or a crisis, a "policy window" opens-another
innovation integral to Kingdon's scholarship-and a policy issue ultimately
finds its way onto the governmental agenda.' 3

Kingdon's pioneering study of agenda-setting across the government should be credited with
having worked through this idea and helpfully confronted many other conceptual difficulties
in the study of policy agenda-setting more generally.
11.
See, e.g., ELAINE C. KAMARCK, How CHANGE HAPPENS-OR DOESN'T ix-x, 135
(2013); KINGDON, supra note 10; LawrenceJ. O'Toole, The PublicAdministrator's Role in Setting
the Policy Agenda, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 225, 225 James L. Perry ed.,
1989); NELSON W. POLSBY, POLITICAL INNOVATION IN AMERICA 1, 5-6, 173 (1984).
12. KINGDON, supra note 10, at 92.
13. Kingdon's framework of confluent streams is similar to Cohen, March, and Olsen's
"garbage can model" of decisionmaking, in which solutions go looking for problems with
which to link. Michael D. Cohen, James G. March &Johan P. Olsen, A Garbage Can Model of
OrganizationalChoice, 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q 1, 1 (1972). Sometimes solutions percolate but lie
dormant for years until a problem stream emerges to which they can be linked. The
broadest conception of agenda-setting would include consideration of the source of ideas for
different solutions. ROBERT B. REICH, THE POWER OF PUBLIC IDEAS 3-7 (1988).
For
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Generations of political scientists since Kingdon have largely affirmed his
dynamic account of agenda-setting, although they have also further
developed the mechanisms of agenda change with models of, among other
things, punctuated equilibrium and path-dependence.1 4
Kingdon's
"streams-and-windows" conception of policy agendas seemed also to
accord well with our workshop participants' general intuitions about
regulatory agenda-setting. The regulatory agenda-setting process, they
agreed, is relatively fluid and subject to a variety of pushes and pulls.
However, despite its messiness, regulatory agenda-setting is not pure chaos.
Perhaps it might best be considered a kind of "controlled chaos."
Participants seemed to agree that learning how to measure and
understand the flow of policy streams could help in understanding better
why some issues are more likely to make it onto the real agendas of
regulatory agencies. Just as with governmental agendas more generally,
policy entrepreneurs interested in regulatory issues search for opportunities
to link problems, policies, and politics by trying to take advantage of
focusing events to make some issues more of a priority for a regulatory
agency.
Yet regulatory agenda-setting might also exhibit certain
regularities not necessarily present with more general policy agendas.
"Stream flows" might, for example, show certain seasonal patterns, with
agencies' agendas varying across different stages of a presidential
administration. Agenda-setting early in the first term of an administration,
as new appointees are being selected, may well differ from agenda-setting
nearer to a re-election campaign, which may differ in turn from
agenda-setting during an incumbent's second term.' 5
The flip side of the processes by which certain agency actions rise to the
top of an agency's agenda are the processes by which other actions do not
rise. The patterns and dynamics surrounding what keeps an item from
example, in the regulatory context, the well-known EPA air pollution "averaging" regulation
at issue in the Supreme Court's Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
(Chevron) case stemmed from a "bubble concept" developed by academic economists. See 467
U.S. 837, 840-42, 864 (1984); Thomas M. Merrill, The Stou of Chevron: The Making of an
Accidental Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAw STORIES 398, 402-03 (Peter L. Strauss ed.,
2006).
14. Christopher M. Weible, Introducing the Scope and Focus of Public Poli Process Research
and Theou, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 3, 10, 12 (Paul A. Sabatier & Christopher
M. Weible eds., 2014); Christopher M. Weible, Advancing Poli Process Research, in id. 391,
392, 395, 400; Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 251, 251 (2000).
15. Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the
Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 892 (2008); see also PAUL C. LIGHT, THE
PRESIDENT'S AGENDA (3d ed. 1999) (showing that presidents are able to affect the agenda
more in the first year of each term before the election cycle impedes).
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rising on the agenda may turn out to be different from, but as important as,
what leads an item to rise on the agenda. Indeed, some scholars have
contended that well-funded, entrenched interests often succeed in
strategically blocking potential agenda items that threaten their existing
advantages.' 6 After all, concentrated interests that stand to lose from new
regulatory policies that would deliver diffuse benefits will be easier to
mobilize to resist those policies.
Applying Agenda-Setting Concepts to the Regulatory Process
Empirical research presented and discussed at our workshop on agendasetting suggested that, when it comes to rulemaking activity specifically,
many agency rules get started because of informal interactions between
regulators and regulated entities.' 7 In these interactions, agency officials
and business representatives share information about amendments to
existing regulatory schemes that are needed to reflect changes on the
ground in the regulated industry. These kinds of workaday "amendment"
rulemakings, the kinds of maintenance rules needed to keep regulatory
systems up to date, account for eighty-five to ninety percent of all
rulemaking, according to research presented at our workshop.' 8 Moreover,
some participants noted that agencies often share information with one
another about new problems; sometimes agencies that are limited by their
statutory authority will persuade other agencies to conduct a rulemaking
under their authority that will address a broader problem. This appears to
have been what happened, for example, when banking regulators put new
rules on the agenda of the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
Overall, the bulk of discretionary rulemaking activity at the federal level
seems to stem from the subtle interaction of a variety of interested actors
16. Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces ofPower, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 947
(1962). For recent empirical studies of this blocking dynamic, see Susan Webb Yackee, The
Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying: Pre-ProposalAgenda Building and Blocking During Agency Rulemaking, 22
J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 373, 373-74 (2012); Keith Naughton et al., Understanding
Commenter Influence During Agency Rule Development, 28 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 259, 259
(2009).
17. William F. West & Connor Raso, Who Shapes the Rulemaking Agenda? Implicationsfor
BureaucraticResponsiveness andBureaucratic Control, 23 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 495, 49596 (2013). This research study followed the only previous empirical study on regulatory
agenda-setting in its reliance on interviews with rule writers. See Marissa Martino Golden,
Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: The Case of Agenda Setting 2, 24 (Oct. 9, 2003)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). Golden's study differed by systematically
sampling rules from the Unified Agenda and using interviews to trace the sample rules to their
origin. Overall, West & Raso sampled 276 rules from over thirty agencies from the Spring
2007 Unified Agenda. West & Raso, supra note 17, at 495.
18. West & Raso, supra note 17, at 506 n.20.
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and institutions working to connect different sub-policy streams.
Some workshop participants suggested that research on interest group
involvement in regulatory agenda-setting raises questions about the limited
role of the broader public in rulemaking. If most rules derive from
interactions between agency officials and representatives from regulated
businesses or even an elite cadre of policy experts, this raises the specter of
regulatory capture.1 9 Moreover, some participants speculated that the
apparent workaday incrementalism of most rulemaking activity might be
connected with a larger phenomenon of regulatory ossification: as agencies
become beleaguered and overwhelmed by a variety of pressures and
constraints in their day-to-day work, they are unable to initiate many major
new rulemakings. When they do initiate major rulemakings in response to
a policy crisis or another opening in the policy window, it takes the agency
so long to get a rule completed that, by the time it is finished, the crisis has
already passed and the rule is no longer as needed as it once seemed. As a
result, the major task for the agency often becomes one of modifying the
rule through incremental revisions to fit the changed circumstances-or
perhaps to erode the rule's impact after the public attention to the
underlying issue has faded. Agencies, all the while, remain basically fixed
in a permanently reactive mode. 20
Not all participants agreed with this "erosion" hypothesis. Even if it
were the case that many rules amend prior rules after the policy spotlights
are turned off, some participants disagreed that this necessarily would be a
problem. Rules adopted in the heat of a crisis may well be ill-considered or
poorly designed, perhaps especially if they are mainly serving as symbolic
responses. Most participants applauded those agencies that change their
rules when business conditions change or new technological developments
emerge, rather than keeping obsolete or unduly burdensome rules on the
books. Yet many agreed that it would also be helpful to develop ways to
make it easier for agencies to pursue important new initiatives as well as to
update existing rules.

&

19. The term "regulatory capture" has long been employed to describe situations when
a regulated industry achieves disproportionate influence over a regulator's decisionmaking
and moves regulatory policy away from the broader public interest and toward its own
private interests. See, e.g., PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE 1, 5 (Daniel Carpenter
David A. Moss eds., 2014); George J. Stigler, The Theor of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
EcON. & MGMT. Sci. 3, 3, 5, 10, 12 (1971).
20. For one perspective on the seemingly permanent reactive posture of agencies and
the erosion of public interest legislation (and an argument that it is in part attributable to a
conscious effort by de-regulatory interests to limit the effectiveness of agencies), see THOMAS

0.

McGARITY, FREEDOM TO HARM: THE LASTING LEGACY OF THE LAISSEZ FAIRE REVIVAL

6-7 (2013).
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In contrast with the general policy agenda in Washington, D.C.,
agencies' rulemaking agendas are not entirely discretionary. According to
research presented at our workshop, around thirty-seven percent of all
agency rules are legally required that is, they are initiated in response to
either legislative mandates (about thirty-four percent of agency rules can be
traced to specific statutory commands) or court orders imposed on agencies
without a clear underlying statutory source (the remaining three percent).21
Within this class of mandatory rules, the vast majority stem from efforts by
Congress to control the output and timing of rulemaking, whether through
commands to regulate or statutory deadlines. 2 2 Of course, this does not
mean that these mandatory rules are exempt from the dynamics of
agenda-setting; after all, agencies do not always implement rules when
required. Whether mandatory or discretionary, different rules (as with
other administrative actions) compete for limited agency time and
attention-and both arise in an often conflictual policymaking environment
populated by a variety of actors and interests, including advocacy groups,
regulated industry, Congress, the White House, and the courts. However,
the mandatory nature of some rules will mean they are subject to somewhat
different agenda-setting dynamics than exist for discretionary rules. It is
even possible, some participants suggested, that mandatory rules extract a
disproportionate amount of agency staff attention, crowding out other
potentially more important discretionary rules that might have otherwise
made it onto an agency agenda. In this way, the legalism enveloping so
many mandatory rules might stifle agency flexibility and responsiveness,
contributing to much decried political decay.23
If agenda-setting differs between mandatory and discretionary rules,
then agenda-setting surely also differs for highly salient rules, whether they
are mandatory or not. One workshop participant usefully distinguished an
agency rulemaking Agenda (with a capital A) from an agency rulemaking

21. West & Raso, supra note 17, at 504 tbl.1. For significant rules, the number goes to
45.8% (counting, again, rules that were required by Congress or court order, respectively).
Id. at 505 tbl.2. While she does not quantify the amount of the agenda set by Congress, the
courts, and interest groups, Marissa Golden found in the five agencies she studied in depth
that "if you want to know why an agency is undertaking a rulemaking, the first place to look
is Congress and the next places to look are the courts and interest groups." See Golden, supra
note 17, at 19-21.
22. West & Raso, supra note 17, at 504-06.
23. See FRANCIs FUKUYAMA, POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL DECAY 7 (2014). Of
course, the causes of decay are debated and highly normatively charged. Certainly, one
strategic tool for those who have an interest in decay (whether pro-government or antigovernment) is thought to be distraction and obfuscation, which some have argued is
facilitated by over-legalization. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure,

and Information Capture, 59 DUKE LJ. 1321 (2010).
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agenda (with a lower case a). According to this view, agenda-setting for
brand new rulemakings differs from agenda-setting for workaday revisions
to existing rules, and agenda-setting for high-impact or politically
contentious rulemakings differs from that of more "ordinary" new rules.
Researchers studying agenda-setting might wish to distinguish, for example,
between economically significant rules-those with an annual economic
impact of $100 million or more-and other significant or non-significant
rules.

24

Combined across all federal agencies, economically significant rules

number less than one hundred in any given year, compared with total
annual rulemaking output in the thousands of rules. Many participants
seemed to agree that it was likely that agenda-setting differed for this small
subset of rules (and perhaps other subsets). If so, to ignore these differences
would lead to distortions in both the positive and normative analyses of
agenda-setting. It might, for instance, be normatively more tolerable that
"small a" agenda items are largely worked out behind closed doors, while
the same practices could offend democratic principles with respect to
"capital A" agenda items.
Scholars must take care to define clearly the scope of any empirical
inquiry into or normative evaluation of agency agenda-setting. Workshop
participants stressed that the differences between types of rules as well as
the diversity of regulatory agencies in Washington, D.C.-from executive
branch social regulatory agencies to so-called independent financial
regulatory agencies-means that no single "regulatory agenda" exists.
Instead of an agenda, there are actually many different regulatory agendas;
these regulatory agendas may also at times interact with, or get affected by,
the broader and more general policy agenda.
Ultimately, agenda-setting is a continuous dynamic at work within each
agency and with respect to different types of rules. It makes sense, then, to
try to break the problem into pieces. One natural starting point is to focus
on the outside institutions and actors that seek to change the agenda. This
was, for instance, the approach employed by Kingdon, who focused his
interviews on broad cross-sections of relevant policy communities, from
civil servants to high-level political appointees and government officials,
and from interest groups to influential researchers and think tanks.25

24. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). Executive Order
12,866 provides for regulatory review of rules that are at least "significant," meaning that
they are likely to create policy inconsistencies, affect budgets and entitlements, or raise novel
or legal issues. In addition, if a rule is likely to have an annual effect of $100 million on the
economy, it is designated an "economically significant" rule and must be accompanied by a
benefit-cost analysis. 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,738.
25. KINGDON, supra note 10, at vii.
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Perhaps generalizable patterns of agenda change can be found in the
patterns of behavior demonstrated by these other actors as they compete to
wield influence over agencies. It is to some of those major outside
institutions that we now turn. 26
II. OUTSIDE INSTITUTIONS

Although agencies' agendas will no doubt be affected to some degree by
the preferences and priorities of the leaders within each agency, many
workshop participants seemed to agree that, especially with respect to
highly salient rules, regulatory agenda-setting is often heavily influenced by
the work of actors or institutions external to agencies. But exactly who are
these outside influences on agenda-setting in the regulatory process and
how do they affect agency decisions?
We have already indicated that many workaday rules seem to be
prompted by suggestions from regulated industry. In addition to business
influence, agencies are subjected to pressures from across the three
branches of government. We focus here on each of those three branches
and discuss how they frequently influence the content and pace of agencies'
agendas-and especially how the interaction of interest groups with these
other governmental institutions can affect agenda-setting.
A. Congress
Participants agreed that Congress plays a major role in regulatory
agenda-setting. According to one study discussed at the workshop, an
estimated thirty-four percent of all rules can be traced directly to specific
congressional demands to regulate.27 These demands vary; some impose
deadlines, while some send soft demands stating that the agency "shall"
regulate on a particular issue. Even with respect to specific statutory
deadlines, these provisions can vary; some require agencies to issue rules by
certain dates with no consequences except a judicially enforceable legal
deadline, while others have a built-in draconian default rule that would take
effect if the deadline is missed (sometimes called "hammers").
Other
26. We do not here discuss some of the more diffuse outside institutions that Kingdon
found relevant to broader policy agenda-setting dynamics, such as the media or public
opinion. See id. By ignoring these institutions, we hardly mean to suggest that they are
unimportant in the regulatory context. See Cary Coglianese & Margaret Howard, Getting the
Message Out: Regulatoy Policy and the Press, 3 HARV. INT'LJ. PRESS/POL., Summer 1998, at 39,
39. But just as scholars have tended to neglect regulatory agenda-setting, they have perhaps
equally neglected the study of the role of the media and public opinion on the behavior of
regulatory agencies.
27. West& Raso, supra note 17, at 504 tbl.1.

104

ADMmISTRATIVE LA WREVIEW

[68:1

statutes give greater discretion to agencies to pace their progress in
implementing bundles of rules by simply requiring the agency to finish all of
its rulemaking responsibilities by a certain date.28 The result of this
diversity of statutory commands is that there may be some slippage between
the congressional demand for rules and an agency's supply of them, as
Even so, Congress appears
participants at the workshop suggested.
generally very active in trying to shape agency agendas through statutory
deadlines.
In addition, statutes sometimes include requirements that agencies revisit
their rules at periodic intervals. For example, even though the Clean Water
Act has not been amended since 1972, the EPA has revisited certain of its
clean water rules on a regular basis due to statutory requirements for
periodic review. These requirements for periodic review in accordance
with specified statutory deadlines appear to have constituted a significant
force in structuring regulatory workflow at the EPA's water office.
Congress has also sought to control agencies' work through
appropriation riders-provisions added to pressing omnibus spending bills
that then require agencies to promulgate or cease promulgating rules at the
risk of losing funding.2 9 If Congress also ties specific agency actions to
agency funding, this presumably has a considerable impact in getting those
actions onto agencies' agendas.
Finally, Congress can shape agency agendas by creating administrative
procedures that channel and structure private input in the agenda-setting
stage. For instance, Congress has created statutory rights to petition
agencies for rulemaking.30 According to some statutes, petitions filed by
outside groups must be answered by agencies within a reasonable time (or
even by certain deadlines) and can be denied only for good reason.31
To say that Congress influences regulatory agendas through

28.

KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 5, at 75.

29. Jason A. MacDonald, Limitation Riders and CongressionalInfluence over BureaucraticPolicy
Decisions, 104 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 766, 766 (2010).
30. See, e.g., Eric Biber & Berry Brosi, Officious Intermeddlers or Citizen Experts? Petitions and
Public Production of Information in Environmental Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 321, 323 (2010); JASON
A. SCHWARTZ & RICHARD L. REVESZ, PETITIONS FOR RULEMAKING: FINAL REPORT TO
THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE
OF THE
UNITED
STATES
21-24 (2014),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Final%2520Petitions%2520for%252
ORulemaking%2520Report%2520%255B 11-5-14%255D.pdf.
31. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012) ("Each agency shall
give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a
rule."); 21 U.S.C. § 348(b) (2012) (outlining the enhanced procedures and timing for a
response associated with petitions to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration concerning the
use of food additives); 42 U.S.C. 7412(b)(3)(A) (2012) (prohibiting the EPA from denying
petitions related to hazardous air pollutants for only resource limitation reasons).
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administrative procedures, statutory deadlines, appropriation riders, and
regulatory authorizations is not to say that members of Congress seek to
drive agencies entirely on their own accord. On the contrary, interest
groups frequently prompt and work closely with Congress to insert
provisions in legislation, which in effect empowers these groups to monitor
agencies' agendas. It is also conceivable that party politics matter and the
ways that Congress seeks to shape regulatory agendas during times of
divided government (vis-it-vis the White House) are different than when
governmental power is not divided. Congressional influence might also
vary as the length of time increases from the passage of legislation, with the
impact in the immediate aftermath of new legislation possibly differing
from congressional impact with respect to rules issued under older statutes.
To date, empirical research on agency rulemaking agendas has been
limited to fairly specific years, rather than an expanded period that would
reveal these possible longitudinal effects.
Of course, even when legislation makes certain actions mandatory, this
does not necessarily translate into actual control of what agencies do.
Agencies find ways to shirk mandatory duties.
As some workshop
in practice it can
deadline,
a
participants observed, if everything has
effectively become that nothing has a deadline, as agencies deluged with
often unrealistic deadlines then simply need to exercise discretion in
deciding what to do. It is well known that agencies regularly miss their
statutory deadlines and are only really affected by them if interest groups
sue them to enforce the deadlines. Because such suits can only be filed after
a deadline has not been met, the remedy in these cases is for the court-or
the agency and the litigant in a settlement agreement-to come up with a
new deadline, which is effectively an extension of the original statutory
deadline.
Of course, a deadline may well still influence the timing of
agency action, but it neither necessarily determines the timing nor
ultimately the substance of the action. Nor does it preclude subsequent
action by an agency to amend or rescind a rule adopted just for the purpose
of meeting a deadline.
In short, the work that Congress does (often with prompting of interest
group representatives) to make more agencies' agendas mandatory does not
necessarily translate into complete control; however, according to many of
our workshop participants, it does clearly distinguish Congress as a highly
32
influential institution affecting administrative agenda-setting.
32. See Golden, supra note 17, at 19 (noting that empirics strongly support a
"congressional dominance hypothesis"); West & Raso, supra note 17, at 502, 504-505
(finding that Congress was the most powerful institution in influencing the non-discretionary
agenda).
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B. Courts
Courts play a role in shaping agency agendas, too-but their impact is
ultimately derivative of whatever deadlines and other requirements
Congress has inserted into statutes. At least when statutory language is
clear about an agency's duties to follow through on a particular substantive
obligation, courts have little discretion to depart from congressional
priorities. Hence, upon the proper petition by outside entities, they will
routinely enforce statutory deadlines that agencies have failed to meet.
Even if by necessity this involves setting new deadlines through their
equitable powers, courts will back up Congress by threatening possible
contempt of court citations for officials who fail to act in a timely fashion.33
In other cases, where statutory language is not clear, courts tend to be
highly deferential to agency choices. As a result, it is not surprising that
research presented at the workshop shows that, once rules that are initiated
solely at the behest of courts are separately accounted for, they amount to
only three percent of all rules (3.3% of significant rules). 34
A foundation for this deferential posture is the Supreme Court's decision
in Heckler v. Chang,35 which established a presumption of nonreviewability
of agency decisions not to take enforcement action. 36 Although courts will
review concrete agency decisions to deny petitions for rulemaking from the
public,37 and will likewise be able to review agencies' failures to comply
with statutory deadlines,38 the Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Norton v.
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance39 foreclosed most litigation challenging
agency inaction where there is lack of a mandatory duty or deadline. 40
Even after the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA41 signaled a potentially much
greater role for the judiciary in reviewing agency denials of petitions for
rulemaking, most participants in the workshop still seemed to agree that
courts tend to be quite deferential in reviewing petition cases, even allowing

33.
156 U.
powers
34.

35.

See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O'Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law,
Pa. L. Rev. 923, 964-66 (2008) (collecting cases where courts used their equitable
to impose and enforce deadlines).
West & Raso, supra note 17, at 504-05 tbls. 1-2.

470 U.S. 821 (1985).

36. Id. at 837-38 ("We therefore conclude that the presumption that agency decisions
not to mstitute proceedings are unreviewable under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) is not overcome by
the enforcement provisions of the FDCA.").

37.

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527-28 (2007).

38.

Gersen & O'Connell, supra note 33, at 929.

39.

542 U.S. 55 (2004).

40.

See id.

41. 549 U.S. 497.
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agencies to cite a lack of resources as a sufficient reason to deny petitions.42
Empirical research presented at the workshop confirms that courts have
forced agencies into action in very few cases. 43

As legal scholars have long noted, courts lack the resources or expertise
to wade into policy and management questions that have implications for
budgetary resource allocation, and deferential standards of judicial review
in agenda disputes likely reflect courts' awareness of their limitations. 44 It
remains an open and, judging by views expressed at the workshop,
contentious question whether courts ought to exercise more review
authority in cases of agency inaction, particularly in cases demonstrating
persistent agency capture or abdication.
Still, at present, the existing
empirical evidence suggests that courts are at most a relatively minor player
in agency agenda-setting. 45
C. White House
The White House would seem to have a much greater potential for
shaping agencies' agendas on an ongoing basis. 46 The available evidence,

though, suggests that it does not exert that much relative influence over the
initiation of most agency rules.
Executive Order 12,866, which governs the White House regulatory
review process, contains a section on regulatory planning that requires

42. See Schwartz & Revesz, supra note 30, at 21-24 (discussing case law interpreting the
Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA and coming to different conclusions about
the sufficiency of resource allocation reasons offered in support of petition denials).
43. West & Raso, supra note 17, at 504-05 tbls.1-2, 512. Again, it is worth noting that
the line between court-initiated agency action and Congress-initiated action is often blurry.
Raso and West attribute the impact of deadline suits to Congress rather than the courts, but
if courts are instead viewed as having initiated the actions associated with judicial deadlines,
then courts would by definition play a much larger role than is suggested here. Participants
in the workshop noted that at certain agencies, such as the EPA, deadline suits and consent
decrees are a primary influence on the agenda-a pattern noted in the research literature as

well. See Golden, supra note 17, at 9-10.
44. Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1, 1 (2008); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness
Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1658-59 (2004).
45. West & Raso, supra note 17, at 504-05 tbls.1-2, 512.
46. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REV. 2245, 2249 (2001)
(discussing the "methods of presidential supervision" employed during the Clinton
administration and their potential to serve "as part of a distinctly activist and pro-regulatory
governing agenda"). But see Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the
Administrative State: A CriticalLook at the PracticeofPresidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 4951 (2006) (suggesting that empirical studies of the White House's control over the
administrative state in fact overstate presidential influence, as agencies often experience far
less coherent direction from above).

108

ADMmISTRATIVE L WREVIEW

[68:1

annual agency priority-setting meetings, institutes a regulatory working
group for planning purposes, and institutionalizes a biannual process by
which agencies submit information to the Unfied Agenda and Regulatory Plan,
which are published in the FederalRegister.47 And yet, these several planning
mechanisms appear to have been implemented too often in a rote fashion,
with some evidence suggesting that the UnifiedAgenda, while a useful tool for
tracking agency behavior, is too often incomplete or inaccurate. 48 More
fundamentally, it is clear that the Unified Agenda is itself not the locus of the
most important decisionmaking within agencies and reflects only a partial
snapshot of the totality of agencies' "real" regulatory agenda-setting.
Participants noted that presidents appear to have some political stake in the
picture of regulatory policymaking that the Unified Agenda creates, both in
terms of the numbers of rules that are reported and in terms of the timing
of their release. White House involvement with the Unified Agenda in
practice seems to be mainly devoted to ad hoc efforts to respond to how the
agenda will make the administration look to the public and concerned
interest groups, rather than to develop a systematic method of monitoring
and controlling agenda-setting in the agencies.
Nor do presidents appear to have any sustained involvement in
agenda-setting outside of the planning processes articulated in Executive
Order 12,866. In the first term of the George W. Bush administration, the
White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) did
experiment with the issuance of "prompt letters" calling for agencies to
consider initiating rulemakings on particular issues.

49

Yet this mechanism

was sparingly used and has not been continued. Despite the potential for
the White House to use mechanisms like this in order to affect regulatory
agenda-setting, empirical research suggests that the White House makes
little difference in shaping agencies' agendas, at most prompting the
promulgation of very few rules and, at that, ones that tend to be related to
agency management more than substantive policy issues. 50
47. Executive Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,739-742 (Oct. 4, 1993). For
direct online access to the latest UnifiedAgenda and Regulatog Plan, see OIRA, supra note 7.
48. See Recommendation 2015-1: Promoting Accurag and Transpareng in the Unified Agenda,
ACUS (2015), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Unified%20Agenda
%20Recommendation%20FINAL.pdf (discussing some of the problems in current practices
under the Unified Agenda and providing several recommendations that could help improve
the process, including developing real-time updates for progress on rules).
49. William F. West, The Institutionalizationof Regulatog Review: OrganizationalStability and
Responsive Competence at 01RA, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q 76, 82-83 (2005).
50. West & Raso, supra note 17, at 510. West and Raso do note that their sample was
"taken at a single point in time during a single administration" and that their findings might
not even be entirely inconsistent with the idea that "presidents have the ability to shape
agency agendas when they so choose." Id. at 510-11. Nevertheless, they conclude that the
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Some workshop participants were surprised to learn that empirical
research finds so little presidential influence over agency agendas, given the
incentives presidents have to coordinate regulatory policy. But others
suggested that research findings may mainly just reflect the White House's
lack of interest in the workaday rules that make up most of agencies'
published regulatory agendas. Some participants stressed that the White
House will have much greater influence over a small number of rules that
administration officials consider to be the most significant ones. Other
participants suggested that a conclusion that the president exerts only the
most limited influence over agency agenda-setting is consistent with the
White House's persistent informational asymmetry vis-it-vis agencies. It
was also noted that new administrations often start out with constraints
imposed by the regulatory agendas of the previous administration,
particularly when there has been a rash of so-called midnight
rulemakings. 51 White House leaders may, therefore, be expected to spend a
considerable portion of their limited time and institutional capital trying to
redirect existing regulatory initiatives, rather than instituting a
comprehensive and affirmative regulatory agenda of their own.5 2
On the other hand, it is also possible that the White House may have
more influence than academic observers have so far been able to
document.
For one thing, it can be difficult to isolate and identify
presidential influence. It may be that White House influence comes more
in the form of gate-keeping; that is, White House influence to keep
rulemakings off of specific agencies' agendas may be stronger than any
influence prompting agencies to add specific rulemakings to their
agendas.5 3
Negative agenda control of this sort is still a form of
agenda-setting, although it can be more difficult to observe or measure.
Empirical research that attributes agenda items to agencies themselves
might also be missing the important informal lines of communication from
presidency "does not appear to be an important or at least a systematic means of shaping
policy" at the regulatory level. Id. at 511.
51. On the phenomenon known as midnight rulemaking, see Anne Joseph O'Connell,
Ageng Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 471 (2011); JACK M.
BEERMANN, MIDNIGHT RULES: A REFORM AGENDA 3 (2012), https://www.acus.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/FINAL%20Midnight%20Rules%20Report%20%5B5-1412%5D.pdf; Antony Davies & Veronique de Rugy, Midnight Regulations:An Update (Mercatus
Ctr., Geo. Mason U., Working Paper No. 08-06, 2008), http://mercatus.org/
uploadedFiles/Mercatus/Publications/WP0806_RSPMidnighto20Regulations.pdf.
52. See also William F. West, he Administrative Presideng as Reactive Oversight: Implicationsfor
Positive andNormative Theog, 75 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 523, 523-24 (2015).
53. Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatop Review, Capture, and Ageng
Inaction, 101 GEO. LJ. 1337, 1391 (2013) (noting that OIRA review currently focuses
"nearly exclusively on agency action").
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the White House to presidentially-appointed agency leaders. Although an
agency might take credit for having initiated a rulemaking, it is possible that
some of the credit (or blame) belongs to the president or to White House
staff who might have informally encouraged or prodded an agency to take
the lead. Researchers' rather exclusive focus on the review process carried
out by OIRA could well miss the other avenues of influence the president
or White House has, especially the tools that the president can use at the
earliest stages of agenda-setting, including speeches, appointments of
agency heads, designation of White House aides as "czars" over specific
policy issues, and informal pressure applied by the president's domestic
policy staff.5 4 In the end, it seems at a minimum premature at this time to
conclude definitively that the presidency does not exert significant influence
over agency agenda-setting.
D. Outside Influences and Research Challenges
Participants saw great need for research on the relative influence of
outside institutions and to continue to seek still greater rigor, particularly
because existing studies have yet been able sufficiently to overcome certain
challenges inherent in the study of agenda-setting processes. One major
challenge derives from the lack of clear counterfactuals, or what agencies'
agendas would have looked like in the absence of one or more of those
outside institutions. For instance, even though statutory deadlines may be
routinely missed, many participants still hypothesize that they make a
difference compared to what would have happened without these deadlines
having been in place. Even when not fully complied with, deadlines can
indicate that certain projects are priorities for Congress, and they force
agencies to negotiate in court at times over revised timelines and may
sometimes compel agencies to provide a reason for delays. The end result
may be that agencies' priorities shift palpably, even if not dramatically,
from what they would otherwise have been in the absence of the deadlines.
Participants also noted the difficulty in discerning the impact of petitions
for rulemaking. An outright denial of a petition does not necessarily mean
that the agency did not alter its priorities at all. Likewise, the granting of a
54. Researchers' focus on OIRA is narrow in another sense.
Influence on
agenda-setting from within the executive branch might come from other departments and
agencies, not merely from the White House or its regulatory review office. Some agencies,
like the National Transportation Safety Board and the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health, play a specific role in making recommendations that other agencies issue
new rules, whereas other government bodies, like the Financial Stability Oversight Council,
serve to bring the heads of different agencies together to coordinate on regulatory policy
issues.
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petition may not necessarily indicate anything more than an affirmation of
plans an agency already had in place or perhaps merely a symbolic gesture
that seeks to placate the petitioning party with a bare-minimum response.
In a sense, these kinds of methodological challenges call for greater
attention to questions of measurement, both of influence and of what it
means for something to be "on" or "rising on" the agenda. Does an agency
action have to be finished at some point or merely actively considered to be
on an agenda? Should researchers try to distinguish between occasions
when agency officials wholeheartedly embrace an action and occasions
when they begrudgingly move forward? What is the relationship between
agenda-setting and the length of time it takes to adopt a rule, which might
vary depending on whether an agency views a rule as a priority or is simply
dragging its feet?
Another major challenge discussed by participants derives from the
opacity of agenda-setting. Presidential influence on agency agenda-setting,
for example, may be particularly difficult to observe, but that does not
mean it does not exist. Researchers have thus far focused mostly on the
most visible arm of the White House's regulatory apparatus, namely
OIRA.55 Notwithstanding the empirical research indicating that completed

rules seldom are initiated at the prompting of the White House, several
participants provided a plausible basis to speculate that OIRA has been
used to slow down or even effectively stop regulatory proposals that are
inconsistent with administration priorities.
As one participant noted,
researchers should not discount the role that veto-points can play in
agenda-setting, as until rules are finalized they remain subject to negative
agenda control, even if that control may be very hard to observe.
III.

REFORM

The insights from empirical research and decades of experience that
participants brought to the table at the Penn Program on Regulation's
workshop can help inform possible ways to improve agenda-setting in the
regulatory system. Empirical analysis can help establish a baseline for a
kind of "gap analysis," assessing where the regulatory agenda-setting
process currently is and comparing it to a more normatively attractive
vision of where it should be. Considering that research and serious

55. One recent example is an extensive study counting the length of regulatory reviews
by OIRA conducted for ACUS. Curtis W. Copeland, Length of Rule Reviews by the Office of
Information and Regulator Affairs 4 (Dec. 2, 2013) (draft report prepared for consideration by
ACUS),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Copeland%20Report%20
CIRCULATED%20to%20Committees%20on%2010-21-13.pdf.
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thinking about agency agenda-setting remains in its infancy, at least
compared with other aspects of the administrative process, definitive reform
recommendations that could bridge the gap are difficult to make at this
time.
Workshop participants, however, identified and debated five
potential directions for reform.
The first avenue for reform centered on the question of whether agency
agendas currently strike the right balance between rules that are mandatory
versus ones that are discretionary. For instance, some participants noted
that if agencies face too many mandatory rules, such as those stemming
from statutory deadlines or, if reinstated, White House prompt letters, this
could crowd out other responsibilities to the detriment of an agency's
overall mission. Neither Congress nor the White House has the same level
of expertise as agencies, so too much influence by either of these institutions
could mean that agency priorities respond more to short-term political
concerns rather than a broader societal interest, such as the seriousness of
risk facing the public. On the other hand, other participants worried that
too much agency discretion over agendas might lead to other kinds of
problems, such as priorities that depart from public preferences because of
either expediency or undue influence by the regulated industry. The
degree of discretion that agencies should be afforded is a longstanding
tension in administrative law and public administration, but it has too
seldom been considered with respect to agencies' agenda-setting.
A second reform idea is related to the first one. Regardless of the precise
mix between mandatory rules and discretionary rules that merit attention
from a public interest perspective, are agency agendas simply too full? In
other words, do agencies have sufficient capacity to address all the issues
that Congress, the president, or the public expects them to address?
Several participants expressed clear concern about the government's
capacity to assume responsibility for all that it should. One participant
lamented that agency officials also have too little time for considering "big
ideas" about how they can best deliver public value. Of course, Congress
could increase agency budgets and thereby expand regulators' capacities,
but short of that (unrealistic) prospect, participants suggested several other
possible options for making the most of limited agency resources:
Create commissions or external audit processes to focus specifically
on agency priorities and issue recommendations about how to
allocate scarce agency resources and attention.56
56.

Glen Staszewski, The Federal Inaction Commission, 59 EMORY LJ. 369 (2009);

MICHAEL MANDEL & DIANA G. CAREW, REGULATORY IMPROVEMENT COMMISSION: A
POLITICALLY-VIABLE
APPROACH
TO
U.S.
REGULATORY
REFORM
(2013),

http://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/05.2013-Mandel-

2016]

AGENDA-SETTLGIN THE REGULATORYSTATE:

THEORYANDEVIDENCE

113

*

Make changes in judicial doctrines about agency agenda-setting to
allow for greater oversight by courts of the rationality of agency
priorities.5 7
* Encourage or require agencies to conduct regulatory analyses of
potential items to be added to their agenda, perhaps even subjecting
agencies to a requirement that they seek to maximize net benefits
when choosing what rulemakings to initiate.5 8
Institutional reforms such as these might not solve real problems of
regulatory overload, but at least they might help agencies better rationalize
the discretionary resources they have. Any such reforms would, of course,
impose their own constraints and costs on agencies, again raising the
question of how much discretion agencies should have over their agendas.
A third reform avenue concerns White House oversight.
Many
an
missing
been
have
presidents
that
agree
to
seemed
participants
agency
over
influence
opportunity to provide more proactive
agenda-setting. They thought that presidents have much to bring to the
table because of the particular institutional capacities and features of the
modern presidency.
For example, the White House can play a
coordinating role, helping to ensure that the collective regulatory agenda
reflects the public's sense of priorities. Indeed, the president might well be
the best situated institutional actor to promote greater congruence between
agency priorities and public preferences because of his national
constituency, thus better promoting democratic responsiveness in the
regulatory process.59 Not all agree that presidents act in this ideal fashion
all of the time; indeed, some research suggests that White House officials
may disproportionately listen to a rather select segment of the public during
the course of their regulatory review process. 6 0 If that is true, this may not
be inevitable but just a relic of an imperfect, backward-looking OIRA
review process, and it need not deter scholars and policymakers from
considering other ways that presidents could act as more proactive
CarewRegulatory-Improvement-CommissionA-Politically-Viable-Approach-to-USRegulatory-Reform.pdf.
57. Bressman, supra note 44, at 1658-60.
58. It is worth mentioning that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Michigan v. EPA
might have nudged agencies toward greater consideration of the costs and benefits of
regulation at the agenda-setting stage of the regulatory process. In that case, the Supreme
Court held that the EPA erred when it decided to begin a rulemaking addressing mercury
emissions without considering the costs of regulatory action. Michigan v. EPA, No. 14-46,
slip op. (U.S.June 29, 2015).
59. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 46.
60. Simon F. Haeder & Susan Webb Yackee, Influence and the Administrative Process:
Lobbying the U.S. President's Office of Management and Budget, 109 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 507, 507
(2015).
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agenda-setters.
The fourth potential reform avenue relates to the cumulative burdens of
regulatory agendas. As many participants noted, new agency leaders are
rarely able to start their tenure on a blank slate; instead, most leaders
inherit an existing regulatory agenda, which may serve to reinforce
bureaucratic sluggishness and unresponsiveness.
This is especially
worrisome if most of agencies' time is devoted to updating and modifying
old rules that have become outmoded, rather than addressing new
challenges. Some participants suggested reform ideas that might break
through regulatory inertia, such as sunset provisions, 61 institutionalized
mechanisms for retrospective review, 62 regulatory budgeting, 63 or the
adoption of one-in-one-out rules which would require agencies to rescind
one rule for every new rule they seek to promulgate. 64
Finally, workshop participants discussed the possibility of enhancing
public involvement in agenda-setting. Administrative agencies vary in
terms of the degree of transparency and public participation in their
agenda-setting processes. All agencies, though, have a variety of tools at
their disposal for generating public feedback during the agenda-setting
61. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN 86,
86-117 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2012); Vern McKinley, Sunrises without Sunsets: Can Sunset Laws
Reduce Regulation?, 18 REG., no. 4 1995, at 57 (providing examples of legal scholars who
promote sunset laws).
62. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Moving Forward with Regulatog Lookback, 30 YALE J. ON
REG. 57 (2013); MICHAEL MANDEL & DIANA G. CAREW, supra note 56; JOSEPH E. ALDY,
LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RETROSPECTIVE REVIEWS OF
AGENCY RULES AND THE EVIDENCE FOR IMPROVING THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF

REGULATORY POLICY (2014), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Aldy
%2520Retro%252OReview%252ODraft%252011-17-2014.pdf.
63. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Rosen & Brian Callanan, The Regulatog Budget Revisited, 66 ADMIN.
L. REV. 835 (2014); Eric A. Posner, Using Net Benefit Accounts to DisciplineAgencies: A Thought
Experiment, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1473 (2002); JOHN F. MORRALL III, CONTROLLING
REGULATORY COSTS: THE USE OF REGULATORY BUDGETING, ORGANIZATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD/GD (92)176 7 (1992) (advocating

the use of regulatory budgeting); R.T. Meyers, Regulatog Budgeting:A Bad Idea Whose ime Has
Come?, 31 POL'Y SCI. 371 (1998) (providing a less sanguine view of regulatory budgeting).
For a regulatory budgeting proposal offered by a Republican candidate for U.S. President,
see Regulatog Reform: The Regulatog Crisis in Washington, JEB! 2016 (Sept. 22, 2015),
https://jeb2016.com/the-regulatory-crisis-in-washington/.
64. The United Kingdom and Canada have followed "one-in, one out" policies
limiting the introduction of new regulations without corresponding repeals of existing
regulations. See, e.g., Red Tape Reduction Act, S.C. 2015, C L-12 (Can.); ONE-IN, ONE-Our
STATEMENT OF NEW REGULATIoN, HMGOV'T (2011), https://www.gov.uk/government
/uploads/system/uploads/attachmentdata/file/31617/11 -p96a-one-in-one-out-newregulation.pdf. Such a requirement has also appeared in legislative proposals in the United
States. See, e.g., The RED (Regulations Endanger Democracy) Tape Act, S. 1944, 114th
Cong. (2015).
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phase. For instance, they could:
* Solicit early comments on proposed regulatory plans;
* Convene strategic planning advisory committees of diverse sets of
interested parties; or
* Encourage outside groups to file more petitions for rulemaking.
Some agencies are already engaging in some of these practices. The
Internal Revenue Service, for example, issues an annual notice in the
Internal Revenue Bulletin and requests public comment on what its priority
projects should be. 6 5 It might seem at first glance that all agencies should
take greater steps to promote public participation and democratic
responsiveness in their agenda-setting processes.
However, as some
participants noted, institutionalizing greater public participation in
agenda-setting is not cost-free, and some such efforts might also carry with
them some of their own risks. One participant, for example, argued that
the Consumer Product Safety Commission's encouragement of citizen
petitions may have distracted that agency from scanning for and addressing
more pressing threats on its own. In addition, any agency mechanisms for
public involvement must be carefully designed and monitored, so they do
not simply serve as a vehicle for narrow interests to capture an agency's
agenda and lead it astray from what the public values.
When it comes to reforms, most workshop participants seemed skeptical
that any magic bullet could be found. With the complex influences at work
in regulatory agenda-setting, any concrete reform effort aimed at altering
the balance of power between various actors will be more likely to succeed,
or at least to avoid unanticipated negative consequences, if it can be
carefully designed with the benefit of rigorous research. That research,
though, must be built on an awareness that agency agendas do vary.
Reforms that may affect the workaday agenda for what are, numerically
speaking, the bulk of agency rules may not work the same way for salient
rules subjected to intense pushes and pulls of other governmental and
nongovernmental actors.
Potential variation in agenda-setting across
different agencies will also likely mean that no one-size-fits-all reform can
be found. Workshop participants agreed at the end of the day that scholars
should devote greater attention to the study of agency agenda-setting and
that practitioners and government officials should continue to explore ways
to improve agenda-setting in socially beneficial ways.

65. Public Comment Invited on Recommendations for 2015-2016 Priority Guidance Plan, IRS,
Notice 2015-27, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-ud/Notice_2015-27.pdf (last visited Feb. 1,
2016).
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CONCLUSION

Why do agencies decide to work on some problems and issues but not
others?
This question, a variant on one that social scientists have
considered more generally for government overall, has so far escaped much
sustained attention among those who study administrative agencies and the
regulatory process. To stimulate further attention to and research on
agenda-setting, the Penn Program on Regulation brought a group of
leading governmental and non-governmental practitioners together with
the small number of key researchers who have already begun to study
agency agenda-setting. This Essay has summarized the discussions that
took place at the workshop, highlighting the conceptual frameworks
participants offered, as well as their insights, from both research and
practice, about how agencies' agendas are affected by Congress, the courts,
and the White House. By putting a spotlight on a crucial part of the
regulatory process that has remained relatively hidden, we hope not merely
to advance future scholarship but also to inform governmental practice and
reform. Further empirical research stemming from this dialogue can, we
hope, inform sensible reforms that help bring governmental practices more
into conformity with normative expectations about how a rational,
well-functioning agenda-setting process should function in a democratic
system. We encourage scholars to continue the discussion about regulatory
agenda-setting started here.
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